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Emerging Threats to International Security:  





This paper is to anticipate emerging issues that challenge the international community. 
Borrowing from the concept of bipolarity between communist and capitalist system during the 
Cold War, the interacting dynamics of environmental change, refugee flows, and conflicts were 
here labeled as tripolarity, a destructive set of interactions which increases global insecurity. 
The end of the Cold War seemed to promise peace, but countries soon fell prey to the violence 
of renewed ethnic rivalries, nationalism, and self-determination. These violent conflicts perhaps 
have caused more environmental destruction and human suffering (e.g. death or refugee flows) 
than the old, ideological conflicts. Moreover, such environmental change and refugee flows 
have come to the fore in global politics, not only as a consequence but also as an emerging 





In the traditional world order which was characterized by the ideological conflict between 
the Eastern and Western blocs, ‘low politics’ involving environmental and humanitarian 
issues was accorded a second priority. After the collapse of the Communist bloc, the world 
seems poised to grant a ‘higher’ priority to the role played by such ‘lower’ issues in the 
agenda for global peace. Despite increasing awareness that environmental decline both 
produces and is a product of conflict, little is known about the links between environment 
and conflict due to lack of conceptual clarity about what environmentally-induced conflict 
means and the inadequate evidence about the linkage. In the meantime, the objective of 
building a peaceful world order is challenged by the intensification of tribal combustion and 
ethnic conflicts which are now tearing apart numerous multiethnic societies. As ethnic 
conflicts engulf the post-Cold War world order, there seems neither enough resources nor 
enough energy for the world to make the concept of environmental conflicts lucid and 
operational or to explain them as an escalating peace-threatening factor. Once again, issues 
concerning environmental conflicts have been relegated to the world’s back burner. 
Another issue that has been left unaddressed in international politics is the assessment of 
environmentally induced population displacement. Since the 1970s, violent upheavals in less 
developed countries have produced massive refugee movements. In the year 2000 alone, 
there are more than 10 million refugees and 5 million internally displaced persons (UNHCR 
2000). Meanwhile, people have also been forced to leave their homelands as much due to 
economic misery and environmental disruption as because of political oppression and civil 
violence. Overpopulation, land pressures, poverty, famine, epidemics, or natural disasters 
also produce large numbers of uprooted people, adding a new burden to an already grave 
global (political) refugee problem. It is estimated that 150 million people will be 
environmentally displaced persons by the year 2050. Yet, only those who have crossed 
international borders for political reasons have conventionally been designated as legitimate 
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refugees. Neither the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees nor the 1967 Protocol1 have 
included this newly identified growing group, i.e. environmental refugees. Massive 
environmental refugee movements both within and among nations may prove to be a serious 
destabilizing force as displaced persons exacerbate pressures in the regions they occupy, 
which are often already overcrowded Third World cities or environmentally fragile areas of 
neighboring countries. Denied official refugee status, and therefore international refugee aid, 
desperate displaced communities may initiate and intensify violent conflicts. 
This paper intends to advance the study of the political implications of environmental 
issues and related humanitarian concerns for displaced persons and refugees. Such lower 
issues may not yet be as critical a factor leading to violence as ideological issues were in the 
Cold War, or as ethnic conflicts are currently, but if neglected they may pass through a 
threshold of irreversibility and promote a continuing cycle of violent conflicts in the new 
millennium.  
This study seeks to examine systematically the tripolar interactions among environmental 
change, refugees, and conflicts (a condition hereafter referred to as tripolarity). By analogy 
with the concept of bipolarity between communist and capitalist system, which defined the 
Cold War, the interacting dynamics of environmental change, refugee flows, and conflicts are 
here labeled tripolarity, a destructive set of interactions which increases insecurity and 
discourages the struggle for building an new Post-Cold War world order.  
This initial attempt to build a framework of tripolarity is justified on both theoretical and 
practical grounds. From the theoretical perspective, studying the effects of tripolarity serves 
as an effective vehicle with which to link human communities and their environments in 
international politics. These are increasingly interdependent and one cannot be protected 
without the other. Yet the study of political action, whether violent or nonviolent, has focused 
on the extent to which acts against human beings or crimes against humanity (e.g. 
dictatorship, oppression, and genocide) lead to struggle between rulers who support the 
status quo and those who seek to revise political relations. Little attention has been devoted 
to the impact of acts carried out against nature and indirectly against people. For example, to 
what degree does ecocide catalyze its victims (i.e. environmental refugees) to take up violent 
political actions? Studying the consequences of tripolarity promotes an understanding of how 
violence against nature, as well as against human beings, affect strategies (both violent and 
nonviolent) of political mobilization by targeted groups.  
In practical terms, an awareness of the negative implications of tripolarity can facilitate 
researchers and policy-makers to better appreciate environmentally induced population 
displacements and the conflicts caused by them. This new awareness may then compel the 
U.N. to expand its conventional definition of refugees to include environmentally displaced 
persons. Having achieved refugee status and appropriate international protection and aids, 
the environmental displaced can be discouraged from embracing violent action as a means of 
responding to ecocide. In addition, zero-sum situations between contending groups, in which 
one party’s potential gain is another’s loss amidst growing competition for scarce resources, 
can be minimized, if not avoided. 
 
 
                                            
1 The 1951 Convention on refugees identifies refugee eligibility as those seeking asylum abroad 
and having ‘well -founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of … political opinion …’ The 
Convention was amended as the Protocol in 1967. 
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2. TRIPOLARITY OF ENVIRONMENT, REFUGEES, AND CONFLICTS:  
A THEORETICAL INQUIRY 
 
The theoretical examination of environmental change, refugees, and conflicts within the 
social sciences has been sparse. In order to understand the theory of tripolarity and its 
relationship to international politics, six basic questions must be posed: i) what are 
environmentally induced conflicts?; ii) how environmentally devastating can conflicts or 
wars be?; iii) how does environmental change produce refugees?; iv) what are the 
environmental implications of sudden refugee influxes and long-term residency of displaced 
populations in a host society?; v) to what extent do political conflicts generate refugee 
movements?; and vi) what are the effects of refugee flows and resettlements on political 
stability both at intra-and interstate level? 
 
2.1. Environmental Change 
 
Environmental change may be defined as the decline in the quantity or quality of 
renewable resources that occurs faster than the renewal of that resource by natural processes. 
This includes population-induced ecological stress, renewable resource scarcity, 
environmental degradation, natural or human induced disasters, drought and war induced 
famines often aggravated by political manipulation, and deliberate policies of displacement 
and resettlement. Ecocide refers to the deliberate destruction of the natural environment 
which in turn endangers human life. Often a wartime strategy, it is a major source of 
environmental degradation. Such environmental change has in turn generated displaced 
communities (i.e. environmental refugees) and environmentally induced conflicts (hereafter 
referred to as eco conflicts). 
First, environmental refugees refer to those who have no choice but to leave their habitats 
for their very survival because of natural and human-induced ecological disasters and 
environmental change; or those who are internally displaced or compelled to cross borders as 
a result of harmful development plans, government ecocide, or a government’s rehabilitation 
or resettlement plans which discriminate against specific groups.  
Yet, identifying environmental refugees is a very challenging task, not only because of 
the difficulty of distinguishing them from environmental migrants, but also because many 
environmental refugees are also influenced by economic misery and/or political, ethnic, and 
military conflicts, just as many political and economic refugees are influenced by 
environmental disruption. While some refugees are exclusively the victims of environmental 
degradation, others may be ‘multiplicable.’ In many African countries with few resources 
and fragile governments, economic affliction and environmental disruption are generally 
aggravated by political unrest. Although nature-triggered catastrophes in recent years caused 
poor grain harvests in North Korea, years of an inefficient communist system controlling 
economy and agriculture and enormous military expenditure at the cost of the civilian sector 
are largely responsible for the North Korean food crisis. In this case it is extremely hard to 
make distinctions between environmental refugees and others. In fact, North Korean famine 
victims who fled into China or countries other than South Korea are now trapped by political 
and legal constraints, which were set for the sake of maintaining the order and security of 
sovereign states (Lee 1999). The process by which these environmentally affected 
populations become refugees should be carefully traced by examining the interaction of 




human-induced disasters) which create environmental refugees. Additionally, the 
international contribution, both negative and positive, to generating environmental refugees 
needs to be noted. 
Second, despite increasing awareness that environmental decline both produces and is a 
product of conflict, little is known about the relationship of population and environmental 
dynamics to conflict, i.e. eco conflict, due to lack of conceptual clarity about what eco 
conflict means and the inadequate evidence about the linkage. Not until recently, very 
seldom have attempts been made to explore the causes and dynamics of eco conflict.2 
Homer-Dixon (1991 and 1994) and the members of his Project on Environment, Population, 
and Security at the University of Toronto (one of the most prominent and controversial in 
this subject area) claim resource scarcity as a main cause that can lead to three types of 
conflict: simple scarcity conflict (where at least two states or groups engage in violent 
conflict or warfare), group identity conflict (where groups are displaced from a resource 
scarce region to another region, resulting in tension and conflict), or relative deprivation 
conflict (where one group feels deprived of a resource relative to other groups). Many others 
have also developed models and frameworks of how environmental factors lead to conflict. 
Still, there is much of the controversy over how to address the two central shortcomings, the 
conceptual and the empirical (Diehl and Gleditsch 2001). It is thus important to clarify the 
concepts of eco conflicts by explaining how they proceed. The following stages can provide 
an analytical framework to understand how a society passes to reach the level of eco conflict: 
Stage I (Overpopulation Pressure): Population pressures increase due to dense human 
settlements, and stem from high birth rates, increasing urbanization, and the continuing 
influx of foreign migrants. 
Stage II (Growing Demands): As population increases, human activities, per capita 
resource consumption, standard of living, and human wastes escalate. Additionally, the 
average individual’s level of consumption or affluence is raised further by resource 
consumption and pollution-generating technology development.  
Stage III (Environmental Stress): Increasing population and their growing demands 
increase resource shortages and environmental damage through a vicious cycle – when the 
resource supply becomes scarce or less accessible, then it requires excessively high costs and 
greater environmental damage in order to provide resources for additional people. 
Stage IV (Competition and Tension): Environmental stress, including scarcities and 
degradation, instigate competition among the affected population (local people and migrants) 
within a society, generating political and social tension. During times of competition over 
ecological resources, the affected country’s people usually become more self-conscious and 
self-assertive of their group identity. 
Stage V (Distribution Disorder): Growing competition over scarce resources places 
regimes under heavy stress concerning the ‘orderly’ distribution of insufficient resource 
supplies among an increasing population. The greater the scarcity, the more likely is a 
breakdown of the distribution order. This is because advantaged groups, often including 
government elite members, wield their power to monopolize the valued at the expense of 
other groups. 
                                            
2 For recent discussion on eco conflicts, see Homer-Dixon (1994), Lee (1997a), Daudney and 
Matthew (1999); Diehl and Gleditsch (2001) and articles from Journal of Peace Research May 1998 
(special issue on environmental conflict) and the reports from Environmental Change and Security 
Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center (http://ecsp.si.edu). 
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Stage VI (Environmental Destruction): Without appropriate measures to prevent overuse 
and pollution of renewable resources, ecological stress passes a threshold of irreversibility. 
Even if the environmental condition is partially reversible, it will be a prohibitively long and 
costly process. 
Stage VII (Economic Decline): Environmental destruction such as depletion of fish stocks, 
decreases agricultural and industrial production and causes a lowering of average living 
standards and further impoverishment and malnutrition within developing societies. 
Stage VII (Social Disintegration): Normally, environmental destruction and economic 
woes have the following social effects before producing violent conflict: disruption of 
authoritative political, financial, and legal institutions and accepted social relations; the 
spread of relative deprivation and frustration due to unequal distribution of both ecological 
resources and economic goods; and population displacement including mass migration of 
rural workers into cities or across the national borders. 
Stage IX (Eco Conflict): Environmental destruction and its disruptive effects not only 
create conflicts but also protract ongoing internal disorders. Since conflict is a ‘process’ and 
not a one-time event, environmental issues can add a new dimension to enduring social or 
ethnopolitical disputes. 
To summarize, eco conflict refers to the process by which people take collective action 
(nonviolent protest or rebellion) against governments or other groups to protect themselves 
when they perceive that their well being or survival is threatened by environmental change, 
or unequal access to scarce resources. Aspects of eco conflict can renew old conflicts or 
substantially protract ongoing ones. 
 
2.2. Refugee Flows and Settlement 
 
In defining the links between refugee flows and conflicts, a general proposition is that 
refugees are generated by government repression or persecution, domestic conflicts, or 
regional wars. Most existing studies on refugees and conflicts have focused on the ‘one-way’ 
approach to explain when and why conflicts produce refugees, not vice versa. Refugee 
problems, however, are not only consequences of conflicts or wars, but increasingly are 
causal factors, sometimes even the primary cause of conflicts. Refugee flows sometimes 
incorporate guerrilla fighters who exploit sanctuaries as strategic sites from which to launch 
attacks on their government. Noncombatant refugees may also become ‘unwitting agents’ as 
well as passive victims of conflicts. The refugee problem is no longer a matter of simple 
humanitarian tragedy. Their presence has become a real or potential threat to the host’s 
internal stability, global security, and the emerging new world order, thus repeating a vicious 
cycle: massive flows of refugees fleeing political persecution or wars increase tensions and 
escalate conflicts in the regions where they settle, and in turn contribute to new causes of 
flight. 
At least three effects can be observed when it comes to refugee movements and 
settlements. First, the impact of refugees on communal conflicts within the country of 
asylum is significant. Refugees often increase the rate which land and resources are being 
used up, and this frequently generates tensions between newcomers and native populations of 
the areas where they are concentrated. As the percentage of refugees in relation to the total 
population of a host country increases, both refugees and natives are propelled together 
under conditions of greater competition for scarce goods, land, resources, and jobs. Refugees 




and local peoples. If domestic resources rather than international funds must meet their needs, 
resentment on the part of the receiving government and population that must bear the costs 
will be heightened. Regardless of whether refugees are related to the host’s population or not, 
a sudden, massive influx of refugee populations causes destabilizing factors in the country of 
asylum, which often precipitate social and political instability and strong pressures on the 
host government to repatriate refugees or restrict their inflow. In addition, the extended 
sojourn of displaced communities has attracted not only humanitarian attention and the need 
to acquire relief resources, but has challenged the security of host countries and even whole 
regions.  
Second, refugee flows can cause conflicts between host and source countries. Not 
infrequently, refugees are considered an instrumental vehicle with which the powerful 
countries can attain their foreign-policy objectives. When refugees flee from a neighboring 
country which does not establish amicable relations with the receiving state, refugees can be 
well received since the host government perceives them as a lever with which to pursue its 
national interests against the rival country. The receiving county thus forms alliances with 
refugee groups and supports their attempt to transform the political situation in their country 
of origin. A host government also welcomes kindred refugees from the neighboring country 
because these refugees can serve as allies. Yet, most governments are reluctant to host 
refugee because they usually do not wish to complicate their relations with the refugees’ 
home country. As a consequence, some host governments have closed their borders to 
unwanted refugees, have judged asylum seekers as illegal immigrants, and have attempted 
forcible repatriation. Refugee movements carry the spillover effects, often raising political 
and military tensions between the recipient country and the neighboring country of origin. 
There is the risk that the host will become involved in the conflict between refugees and their 
government, particularly if refugees represent a political or communal minority group in 
their origin country. Even when refugee populations consist solely of noncombatants who are 
uninterested in political or militant action, there is a risk that their presence along the border 
will raise tensions between host and source countries.  
In short, the host government’s responses to refugee flows from other countries are 
greatly affected by the relations between sending and receiving countries. If there is a 
tradition of hostility between the countries, tensions over refugee flows may lead to more 
intensified conflicts as the presence of refugees becomes long-term or a permanent 
resettlement. If the countries have shared a cooperative history, the host government, not 
wishing to upset its ally, is likely to use force against refugees, either by forcible relocation 
within the host country, or border controls to keep most or all of them out. However, 
irresponsible fighters in the host country can target refugees and their country of origin as 
scapegoats for popular discontent. The result can be a militant nationalism that destroys the 
cooperative relationship that once existed between neighboring countries.  
Third, refugee influx contributes to demographic and ecological strains and economic 
dislocation. Given the degree of global environmental damage, the refugee contribution to 
environmental degradation may be minimal. But no matter where refugees flee, sudden and 
unexpected increases in population can cause the disruption of the delicate ecological 
balance of their new region. Such environmental disruption generates economic and social 
strains and can wreak havoc in the country of asylum. This is true even for the highly 
industrialized countries of Western Europe and North America, which usually cater far better 
to the needs of their refugees. Still, these developed societies are much less susceptible to 
environmental stress triggered by mass refugee flows and settlement. In many Third World 
EMERGING THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: 
ENVIRONMENT, REFUGEES, AND CONFLICT 
79
societies, a sharp increase in population densities in refugee sites places tremendous burdens 
on the physical environment which must already contend with the natural population 
increase. combined with the large refugee presence, prolonged refugee population stays often 
lead to environmental destruction around refugee camps and settlement areas. 
The environmental impact of the large refugee presence on poorer countries is great. 
Although the ultimate causes of environmental deterioration in refugee-receiving areas are 
similar to those existing in normal communities of high population densities, the effects are 
more startling. This is because refugee camps and settlements are often built in 
environmentally fragile areas. In fact, the majority of refugees today are living in the world’s 
poorest countries. Under normal circumstances, people can choose where to move in search 
of more environmentally sound areas of resettlement. In the case of refugees, however, such 
choices of movement are not usually available. Often they are too busy and desperate fleeing 
for their very survival to enjoy options. In addition, refugees, indiscriminately utilize limited 
resources in the receiving community as they have few incentives to preserve the regions that 
do not belong to them. In sum, large concentrations of refugee population in fragile 
environments lead refugees to utilize the meager resources available in the regions close to 
their camps and resettlement zones, a process which accelerates environmental degradation. 
This in turn poses additional hardships on poor local host populations competing for scarce 
natural resources and possibly forces them to migrate to other areas. Ironically, the search for 
solutions to environmental degradation which produces refugees in one country can generate 
other refugee-producing environmental changes in a receiving nation.       
 
2.3. Ethnopolitical Conflicts  
 
The demise of Soviet Bloc communism seemed to promise peace as bipolar tensions 
melted away, but countries soon fell prey to the violence of renewed ethnic rivalries, 
nationalism, and self-determination. The intensification of tribal combustion and 
ethnopolitical conflicts (i.e. the state of open conflict with states or civil war which is 
conducted between ethnic groups that have politically mobilized to redress their grievances 
and promote the group’s common interests) are now tearing apart numerous multiethnic 
societies and imperiling many Third World regions.  
Ethnopolitical conflicts in the world today are not all the same, but, rather, fall into 
different categories according to the objectives of the contending parties. First, ethnic strife 
breaks out when an ethnic group seeks a separate political entity against the will of its 
government which opposes the group. The main political objective for the group is ‘exit’ for 
independence and autonomy (e.g. Chechnya in Russia, and Kosovo Albanians in Yugoslavia). 
Second, conflict between minorities and the state can occur as the former’s demands for 
regional autonomy or greater rights (civil, political, economic, and cultural) within one 
united state encounter the latter’s indifference or refusal. By raising their ‘voices,’ 
indigenous peoples aim at protecting their lands, resources, and culture from outsiders’ 
encroachments. Also, minorities’ voices pressure to promote their interest within existing 
political systems (e.g. Afar ethnic minorities vs. the Somali-dominated government in 
Djibouti). Third, communal rivalries between ethnic groups within the state cause conflicts 
when they compete for access to, and control of, political power, economic opportunities, 
territory, and scarce resources. Such ethnic tensions between groups are often intensified by 




government group.3 Fourth, violence occurs when the government and dominant groups 
seek to forcibly conquer, annihilate, assimilate, or remove other ethnic minorities (e.g. 
‘ethnic cleansing’ campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Rwandan genocide in 1994). 
Fifth, the resurgence of religious fundamentalism is becoming a source of conflict.4  
Historically, communal or ethnic conflicts are not new. Since the end of the Cold War, 
however, Third World ethnopolitical conflicts have increased in frequency and intensity. 
Among 110 armed conflicts or wars5 during 1989-1999, only six were inter-state conflicts 
and wars. During the same period, there have been 104 intrastate conflicts (Wallensteen & 
Sollenberg 2000), mainly resulted from ethnic and religious rivalries, resurgent nationalism, 
or the struggle for state control. The escalation of communal or ethnic conflicts in the Third 
World is rapidly becoming a main source of humanitarian crises such as genocide and 
massive refugee flows. These violent conflicts have perhaps caused even more human 
suffering than the old, ideological conflicts. Numbers of refugees who fled ethnic violence 
and related repression also have risen during the 1990s (Gurr 2000).  
 
 
3. DYNAMICS OF TRIPOLARITY 
 
3.1. Interactions of the Environment, Refugee and Conflict  
 
The preceding section has discussed the multifarious factors explaining interactions 
between environmental change, refugee movements, and conflicts. The logical consequence 
of clarifying the complexity of tripolarity is an ability to anticipate a new dimension of 
global insecurity. Given the aforementioned arguments, six theoretical propositions can be 
formulated to understand tripolarity.              
 
[P1: C à R]  Refugees are victims of political conflicts and persecution. 
 
         CONFLICT              REFUGEES 
         (e.g.) wars, ethnic         civilians  






                                            
3 For instance, in Kenya, President Daniel arap Mois, trying to prove that multi-party system 
would cause ethnic violence, continue to provoke ethnic violence between his Kalenjin group and other 
ethnic communities, including the majority Kikuyu. 
4 Inspired by the theocratic regime of Iran, Islamic fundamentalists in the Middle East have sought 
to establish governments based on the rule of Islamic law. The resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism is 
usually anti-Western, poses a threat not only to the region affected but to international security. The 
revival of Hindu nationalism in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and India is likely to escalate 
communal conflicts throughout the South Asia region. 
5 ‘Wars’ refer to those cases with at least 1,000 battle-related death per year, while ‘conflicts’ 
refers to those cases with at least 25 (but less than 1,000) battle-related death per year (Wallensteen & 
Sollengerg 2000). 
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[P2: R à C]  The increase in refugee pressures provokes ethnic strife within host countries 
and further creates and exacerbates conflicts between the sending and receiving countries. 
     
        REFUGEES   (create)             CONFLICT 
        politicized civilians        (aggravate)            intra- and 
        warriors                 inter-state 
  
 
[P3: C à E]  Political conflicts (ongoing military campaign, preparations and consequences 
of warfare) cause environmental destruction in the affected countries. 
 
        CONFLICT         ENVIRONMENTAL 
         preparation,         DESTRUCTION 
         campaign, 
         aftermath 
   
 
[P4: E à C]  Environmental pressures (e.g. competition for scarce resources by ever-
growing population; and transboundary resource allocation and pollution) create an intra- or 
interstate war (i.e. eco conflict), renew old conflicts, or protract existing political conflicts 
(e.g. ethnopolitical conflict). Government policies of ecocide (the destruction of the natural 
environment which in turn endangers human life) also lead to the violent prosecution of 
conflicts by affected communities. 
 
          ENVIRONMENTAL   (create)         ECO CONFLICT 
          PRESSURES 
        
       
        ECOCIDE                   POLITICAL  
      (protract)      CONFLICT 
 
 
[P5: R à E]  Refugee flows and resettlements promote the disruption of the ecological 
balance in areas where they are concentrated. 
 
        REFUGEES 
         large-scale,         ENVIRONMENTAL 
         sudden,       DECLINE 









[P6: E à R]  Environmental change (e.g. natural and human-made disasters, resource 
scarcities, ecological degradation, ecocide, and dubious policy-induced displacement and 
resettlement) leads to refugee flows. 
 
(situation 1) Environmental change directly causes refugee flows. 
   
       ENVIRONMETNAL       (create)         REFUGEES 
        CHANGE           (environmental) 
 
 
(situation 2) Environmental change triggers or prolongs political conflicts, which in turn 
produce or multiply refugee flows. 
 
   ENVIRONMETNAL        CONFLICT (create)     REFUGEES 
       CHANGE             (eco & political) (expand)      (mixed) 
 
 
(situation 3) Political conflict results in environmental change which in turn triggers 
refugee flows. This effect also discourages political refugees (who have fled political 
conflicts) from returning home even after their motive for flight is resolved, thus 
transforming then into environmental refugees.6 
 
 POLITICAL   ENVIRONMENTAL   (create)     
REFUGEES 
 CONFLICT   CHANGE     (transform)   (environmental) 
   
 
   This brief review of the six propositions displays how tripolarity functions: 
environmental change is a devastating offspring of human warfare while also being a source 
of conflicts within and among states; refugees are not only harmless scapegoats but also 
unwitting actors of political conflict and violence, and warriors among these refugees in exile 
can be subversive perpetrators of conflict; and refugees are both passive victims and active 
participants in environmental destruction (see Figure 1).  
 
3.2. The Role of the State 
 
No matter what factors are responsible for short-term or protracted conflict, government 
responses to the underlying causes and to conflict itself are crucial in determining the 
escalation or de-escalation of conflicts. In order to understand the role of the state (including 
the effectiveness of political governance and the use of political coercion or accommodation), 
it is helpful to divide countries by regime type: democracy, democratizing, autocracy, and 
anarchic. 
First, Western democracies have enjoyed relative success in discouraging disputes from 
flaring into open conflicts by accommodating political demands. Of course, raise tensions 
                                            
6 For detailed discussion on the distinction among environmental refugees and environmental 
migrants, see Lee (1997b). 
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among minority groups, and thus protests, are prevalent throughout these countries (e.g. 
United States, United Kingdom, and France). Pluralistic and democratic responses (e.g. 
reform, accommodation, and regional autonomy) render violence avoidable or, if 
unavoidable, relatively tractable. 
Second, democratizing states7 are more complex. On one hand, Gene Sharp (1973) 
observed that the political power of a coercive regime may be destroyed by the withdrawal of 
cooperation by its citizens. Based on this insight, various studies of nonviolent struggles 
suggest that nonviolence sanctions, in comparison to violent ones, can be effective in the face 
of oppression and genocide. Nonviolent strategies have often been more successful than 
violent ones in altering government policies or overthrowing repressive regimes. In fact, the 
democratization process in the Philippines (1984 and 2000), South Korea (1987), Eastern 
European countries (late 1980s), Indonesia (1998), and Peru (2000) has especially benefited 
from nonviolent ‘people power.’  On the other hand, the process of democratization, or the 
breakup of authoritarian rule, in Soviet bloc countries and other parts of the world has been 
accompanied by struggles between ethnic groups for political power. Since very few mono-
ethnic states exist, there is a great likelihood that suppressed or latent ethnic rivalries will 
flare up after the fall of authoritarian governments. For example, if the previous government 
favored, or was dominated by, a specific ethnic group at the cost of others, ethnic tensions 
are likely to escalate into open conflict. Such ethnic conflict easily becomes intractable since 
demands for retribution against or punishment of the old region will take on ethnic overtones 
(de Nevers 1993) and the targeted groups will resist with whatever means available. The 
result will be tragic not only because it costs many human lives but because the responses of 
democratizing states may result in a return to an autocratic political system. 
Third, in multi-ethnic societies, inequalities between different ethnic groups coincided 
with the dominant group’s capabilities to hold power. A state’s maximization of power in the 
development process (referred to as dictatorial or authoritarian development) and its 
expanded role in the economic sector, usually results in the immediate transfer of the 
economic (or eco) conflict over the distribution of resources and rewards to a political (or 
ethnic) conflict. For example, the decades-long ethno-religious rebellion of southerners 
against the northern government in Sudan was further complicated when landless 
disadvantaged northerners supported southerners. The more that disadvantaged groups 
experienced political coercion and discrimination, the more likely they are to take up arms 
against their oppressors. But under autocratic rule, extreme oppression tends to stifle conflict 
by inhibiting all opposition (e.g. North Korea and Cuba). Actually, there is a body of 
literature on revolution that finds that it is not caused by extreme oppression but rather by 
political opportunities following partial reforms and rising expectation (Davies 1962 and 
1969; Tilly 1978; Rule 1988; Goldstone; Gurr and Moshiri 1991). In this way, the volatile 
situation of many democratizing countries following autocracy can be understood. And 
irrespective of whether a government uses extreme oppression, absolute poverty or 
desperation fan result in a lack of political action because people are preoccupied by mere 
survival. Still, as UN Peacekeeping Commander General Romeo Dallaire (in Rwanda) said, 
‘when people suffer so much, and in many cases have so little to lose, their instincts tend to 
                                            
7 According to Diamond (2001), these nations can be considered ‘swing states’ as democratic 
institutions exist in these countries but their movement toward liberal and consolidated democracy may 




come to the surface faster.’8  
Fourth, as seen in the case of Somalia and Rwanda, the absence of government control, or 
anarchic conditions, has allowed opposing ethnic groups or tribes to mercilessly fight each 
other and attack defenseless civilians who are killed because of their ethnicity.  
In short, the devastating potential for tripolarity is greatest when no political will and 
commitment exists to counter it. This is true particularly in the case of least developed 
countries where the objectives of rulers focus primarily on regime survival. Incapacitated by 
overpopulation, ecological stress, underdevelopment, massive refugee flows and 
resettlements, and ethnic and civil strife, elites in the poorest countries place a higher value 
on the maintenance of the state as opposed to the well being of their citizen. To secure the 
power and interests of rulers, political coercion is often employed since coercive measures 
are the only available means for the state to assure its existence. the result is to plunge into a 
downward spiral of tripolarity.  
 
3.3. Unconventional Aspects of Tripolarity 
 
Although, as suggested above, the elements of tripolarity flow in all direction, the 
scholarly literature and policy papers have thus far heavily emphasized [P1] and [P3]. First, 
only those in search of refuge outside of their countries of origin, fleeing for political reasons 
(e.g. persecution or inter/intra-state conflicts) are eligible to apply for the internationally-
accepted refugee status, as stated in the 1951 UN Convention and 1967 UN Protocol (P1: 
Cà R). Many scholars and researchers have focused on building a model to explain why and 
when people become refugees and on clarifying differences between refugees and migrants. 
The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) such as the U.S. Committee for Refugees, have also attempted to quantify the level 
of refugee flow and their resettlement or repatriation. Secondly, academic literature and 
policy papers have expressed concern about environmental consequences of war. As 
witnessed in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Cambodia, wars result in the destruction of the 
living landscape, civilian facilities, and dependent human livelihood (P3: CàE). Such 
ecocidal effects of war, it is argued, are not only derived from ongoing warfare but also the 
preparation for war, rendering affected regions unlivable. 
However, it is worth noting under what circumstances we can expect unconventional 
pathways of tripolarity, i.e. environmental change as a source of refugee flows and conflicts, 
(EàR/C); and refugees as sources of environmental change and conflict (RàE/C). This 
discussion must incorporate the three issues which are identified above as emerging issues in 
post-Cold War conflicts (i.e. demographic and environmental pressure, refugee crisis, and the 
role of the state). We have discussed how demographic and ecological pressures in a society 
are likely to lead to tensions and competition for limited resources. In this case, an 
unconventional aspect (EàC) can directly trigger conflicts, but many other factors intervene. 
Without specified objectives, grievances, and organized leadership, competition leads to 
scattered violent acts, not reaching a sustained scale. If this is the case in a multi-ethnic 
society, however, such tensions and competition have greater chances of developing into full-
scale conflicts among different groups within a particular region or country, for those 
                                            
8 This information was acquired in an interview with Mr. Dallaire in the U.N. Headquarters in New 
York, in October 1999, while the author served as a Special Advisor to Independent Inquiry into the 
actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. 
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pressures intensify group identity and mobilization for political action.  
Here, the role of the state is also crucial. Government inaction (or inadequate action) in 
response to environmental disasters or preparation for them can promote refugee-producing 
environmental changes, while government action (ill-conceived development plans and 
population resettlement to the detriment of minorities) can further exacerbate tensions 
between different groups over limited resources and lands, thus leading to conflicts. In short, 
under conditions in which environmental (demographic and ecological) stress coincides with 
sudden, large-scale, or prolonged refugee flows/presence within a heterogeneous society, 
combined with the failure of political governance (by both sending and receiving countries), 
unconventional pathways of tripolarity are greatest. When these are combined with 
conventional sequences (conflicts that produce refugees and devastate the environment), the 
result is to plunge into a downward spiral of tripolarity.  
 
 
4. THE CASE OF SUDAN AND BANGLADESH 
 
The goal of the case studies is to examine whether the causal links specified in the 
theoretical sections are in fact supported by real-world observation. In this study, the 
Republic of Sudan and the Peoples’ Republic of Bangladesh will serve as the cases to 
provide empirical support for the foregoing arguments on tripolarity, with particular 
emphasis on whether environmental change and refugee flows are independent sources of 
conflict or rather add a new dimension to existing conflicts. Each case comports with the 
dynamics of tripolarity, the role of state in tripolarity, and the violent response by affected 
communities. In addition, there are obvious differences between the two countries which will 
facilitate comparative analysis. In regard to natural disasters, for example, Bangladesh is 
more affected by floods while Sudan suffer from severe droughts. In terms of the role of 
government in triggering ecocide, the people of Bangladesh suffer from dubious state 
development projects which favor elites while Sudanese are the victims of civil war or more 
direct ecocide policies.9  
 
4.1. Background of the Crisis in Sudan and Bangladesh 
 
Sudan is a microcosm incorporating numerous complex problems of post-colonialism, 
including ethnic and religious cleavages, dictatorial rule, lack of political legitimacy, 
resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism, economic decay, poverty, environmental degradation, 
persistent droughts, massive famine, long-running civil war, and refugee exodus and influx. 
Geographically, Sudan is the Africa’ largest country with an area of 2.5 million square 
kilometers, slightly more than one-quarter the size of the United States. The country’s total 
land area includes 5.2 percent of arable land and 19 percent of forest area. Demographically, 
Sudan is located at the crossroads of Arab northern Africa and the sub-Saharan black Africa. 
Ethnically, the Sudanese population is heterogeneous to a great degree.10 Ethnic groupings 
are based on cultural and linguistic similarity and on geographic proximity.  
                                            
9 Since the primary focus of this paper is on a theoretical inquiry of tripolarity, the discussion of 
case studies will be limited to summarizing comparative observations of Sudan and Bangladesh.. 
10 According to the 1956 census (the only one conducted to date which gathered information on 




The ethnic, regional, religious, cultural, and linguistic heterogeneity of Sudan is best 
represented in the dichotomy between northerners and southerners. While the Arabized and 
Islamized north (with two thirds of the total Sudanese land) has been politically, 
economically, and culturally dominant, the underdeveloped south constitutes black African 
who are mostly Christians or animists. Over the centuries, contacts between northerners and 
southerners were hostile. North-south encounters were mostly comprised of: i) pre-colonial 
invasions by Arab tribes who raided the south for slaves and booty; ii) intervention by the 
British power at the end of the 19th century; and iii) incursions by successive post-colonial 
governments in Khartoum. Such undesirable contacts only aggravated the north-south 
dualism and consolidated the disadvantaged southerners’ group identity against northerners. 
It is thus no surprise to note that for 35 out of its 45 years of independence, Sudan has been 
driven by the Africa’s longest civil war between Arab Muslim northerners and African 
Christian southerners. The most recent phase of Sudanese civil war broke out in 1983, when 
the Khartoum regime attempted to transform the country into an Islamic state. Southerners 
have firmly asserted their tribal identity against discrimination and rejected assimilation with 
northerners.    
With the complexities of civil war in the Sudan, teeming with intractable issues, the 
prospects for a united Sudan seem not be realistic and instead seem to give the Sudanese 
only one choice: partition (hopefully with economic cooperation and shared services). Yet, 
the north-south split entails a high risk of opening a ‘Pandora’s box’ leading to a full-fledged 
civil war among different southern ethnic groups. Also, their political ‘divorce’ can cause a 
domino effect, serving as a precedent for other African countries that experience hostilities 
between communal contenders. The result could be continued fragmentation of the African 
continent.  
Bangladesh, with a land area of 144,000 square kilometers and a population of 125 
million, is one of the world’s most densely populated nations. Geographically, Bangladesh 
features low-lying tropical terrain on the combined deltas of three major rivers, the Ganges-
Padma, the Brahmaputra-Jamuna, and the Meghna, and is mostly surrounded by India. 
Almost one third of the land is under water during a normal rainy season (from June to 
September) and the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) is the country’s only upland area. The 
country has long been susceptible to natural disasters and environmental degradation and the 
magnitude of disasters has mounted in recent times. Ethnically, Bangladesh is relatively 
homogeneous compared to other South Asian countries. Some 98 percent of the populations 
are Bengalis (mostly Sunni Muslims), while an estimated 250,000 to 300,000 Biharis still 
live in Bangladesh. In addition, about one percent of the country’s population consists of 
tribal peoples, known as Adivasis (27 to 36 different tribes by ethnographers).11 Among 
Adivasis residing in the CHT (10 percent of the country’s total area), the Chakma (whose 
religion is Buddhist and language Pali) comprise the largest tribal population.  
The history of Bengali intrusion into the CHT dates back to the 17th century when the 
Adivasis were forced to withdraw into the upper hills. During British colonial rule the CHT 
Adivasis enjoyed special status with considerable protection and autonomy. The difficulties 
of the CHT Adivasis began with the partition of India in 1947. Although CHT peoples 
(almost totally non-Muslim) wanted to join India, the area was incorporated into East 
Pakistan and the Pakistani government, thus opening the area to economic exploitation and 
                                            
11 Despite their religious and racial differences, the Adivasis share strong bonds with each other 
rather than with the majority Bengali peoples. 
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an influx of Bengali Muslim, annulled their special status. 12  After the secession of 
Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, the situation was further aggravated. Guerrilla warfare by 
the indigenous armed force, Shanti Bahini, began in 1975 when a tribal request for the 
recovery of their former autonomous status and the prohibition of further settlement in CHT 
by outsiders was rejected by the central government.  
 
4.2. Comparative Observations of Sudan and Bangladesh 
 
Political Factors 
The first general observation drawn from the case analyses of Sudan and Bangladesh is 
that despite this study’s attempt to switch emphasis to unconventional pathways of tripolarity, 
their crises can be attributed in substantial part to conventional problems: political reasons 
(e.g. the failure of political governance, the use of coercion, minority groups’ resistance or 
pursuit of self-determination, and ethnic rivalries) contribute to the intensification of conflict 
and therefore massive refugee exoduses.  
Sudan’s civil war is characterized as an ethno-religious conflict. Unless Shari’a (Islamic) 
law is repealed, the conflict between the northern government and southern rebels will not be 
resolved by non-military means. Also, inter-factional fighting between Dinka tribes and non-
Dinkas within the south has emphasized the ethnic feature of the war. Even if the north-south 
war ends, either by the north’s concession or the south’s secession or defeat, the south will 
probably fall prey to tribal clashes. In Bangladesh, its independence war, which was sparked 
by the genocidal aggression of West Pakistani forces against Bengalis, generated millions of 
refugees from East Bengal to India in 1970. Post-independence Bangladeshi governments 
have also failed to accommodate minorities’ and instead have encouraged Bengalis’ 
resettlement into the CHT, thus driving the dispossessed indigenous people to form the 
Shanti Bahini insurgency.  
 
Environmental Factors 
Aspects of eco conflict have been noticeably protracted by the Sudanese ethno-religious 
war, making it a more intractable conflict. ‘Desert encroachment,’ or severe dryland 
degradation, has long been an obstacle to the livelihoods of northern Sudanese and 
eventually caused them to relocate southward. This overall phenomenon resulting from the 
country’s condition of ‘too little water,’ in turn resulted in population pressures and land 
overexploitation, escalated competition for resources, and intensified ethnic identities and 
hostilities in central Sudan.13 These tensions have been largely attributed in this study to 
policy failure or the failure of politics. Inadequate government response to drought-related 
(or war-related) famines and the blocking of emergency food relief has turned into a major 
humanitarian issue around the world. Government action also responsible for the ecological 
aspects of Sudan’s crisis. Advantaged groups such as government leaders and wealthy 
landlords monopolized resources at the cost of the majority, leading to a chain effect of 
environmental destruction, economic decline, social disintegration, population displacement 
(internal and environmental refugees), and protracted conflict. In brief, the Sudanese 
                                            
12 In addition, the construction of the gigantic Kaptai Dam and creation of the Karnafuli reservoir 
in the 1960s devastated the livelihood of indigenous people. 
13 The greater environmental stress and competition among affected populations, the more self-




experience suggest that the tripolarity of environment-refugee-conflict is a contributing or 
facilitating force protracting ethnic disturbances, even though it is not a primary source.  
In comparison, the case of Bangladesh provides a clear example of how environmental 
decline and social tensions result directly from population density. Overpopulated areas 
generate extreme land pressures, economic privation, and vulnerability to natural disasters, 
thus inducing Bengali people to migrate to the CHT in southern Bangladesh. But relocation 
did not provide a solution, and instead caused a collision with tribal peoples who 
traditionally resided in the areas, escalating after 1975 into a violent ethnic conflict. The 
resentment of tribal people against Bengali encroachment on their lands (environmental 
pressures) has obscured differences among different tribes and consolidated their pan-tribal 
group identity, thus triggering rebellion against the ‘Bengalization’ of their lands. 
 
Refugee Factors 
In Sudan, the refugee crises both the exodus of Sudanese and the influx of foreigners (e.g. 
Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees), were more closely related to politically-induced 
humanitarian tragedies, rather than a result of environmental insecurity in settled areas. 
Refugees’ flight is closely related to the political situation in their country of origin. 
Ethiopian and Eritrean refugee ‘floods’ in eastern Sudan were not so much a source of, but 
rather were a result of conflict. Yet, their long presence has often been perceived as a threat 
to Sudanese political stability. Massive refugee influxes (both foreign and internally 
displaced) have caused detrimental environmental effects in arid northeastern and central 
Sudan due to population concentration, overuse of water, overcutting of trees, and land 
overexploitation. Also, drought- and famine-hit environmental refugees (fleeing from Sudan, 
to Sudan, or within Sudan) have often fled their habitats when political and environmental 
factors occur simultaneously. For instance, Sudanese refugee flows generated by the civil 
war have been exacerbated by environmental degradation due to drought and large-scale 
mechanized schemes. In addition, refugee-producing environmental destruction has often 
resulted from wars and government ecocide.  
In the meantime, Bangladeshi refugees have played an active role in shaping 
ethnopolitical conflicts at both the intra-and interstate level. Within the country, 
overpopulation, poverty, and flood-stricken environmental refugees (mostly Bengali people), 
both by government resettlement and by their own volition, were the principal source of 
conflicts in the CHT. Across the border, millions of Bengali environmental refugees who fled 
overpopulation and poverty, together with war-stricken CHT political refugees, have not only 
exacted a heavy environmental toll in India but promoted or exacerbated ethnic conflicts in 
northeast India’s states of Tripura and Assam.14 In addition, India’s operation of the Farraka 
Barrage, with an aim to maximize water withdrawals during dry seasons for its development, 
in turn disrupted downstream Bangladesh’s ecosystem where the affected population has 
suffered from ecosystem destruction and the loss of livelihood. The victims became 
environmental refugees, many of them crossing the border to join millions of other 
Bangladeshi refugees who were already in India. As evidence by the precedents of Tripura 
                                            
14 The implication of large-scale illegal migration, or refugee flows, is grave for the security of 
India. Northeast India (where the majority of Bangladeshis settled) is afflicted by the massive inflow of 
foreigners, triggering or aggravating ethnic conflict. Historically, northeast India was sparsely 
populated. Regardless of varying details, the insurgencies in northeast India share an underlying factor: 
safeguarding tribal society and culture and deterring non-tribal settlement. In this context, the role and 
importance of Tripura and Assam provinces acquires added emphasis. 
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and Assam, this massive influx of outsiders carries a great potential for ethnic conflicts 





In order to break the cycle of tripolarity (i.e. massive flows of political and environmental 
refugees aggravating communal conflicts, which in turn brings forth another enormous wave 
of refugees), to prevent to unnecessary loss of lives, and to protect the displaced and 
dispossessed, immediate, coordinated, and sustained action is needed, such as humanitarian 
intervention coordinated by the United Nations. Political realities, however, often make such 
international community-led intervention in gross human rights violations, domestic conflicts, 
environmental damaging policies, and population displacement unfeasible or ineffective. 
Massive population movements are largely due to environmental decline and harmful 
governmental policies (including ecocide), as well as physical conflict and political 
persecution within a sovereign state. Since international law is founded on the notion that 
nation-states have mutually exclusive jurisdiction over segments of territory and clusters of 
population, the issue of sovereignty exacerbates the contributing pressures to population 
movements. A sovereign state rarely allows external interference in its domestic affairs. 
Overall, it is unfortunate that while the essential objective of a state is to provide its 
citizens with security, government elites are often prepared to violate this objective in order 
to maintain their regime. It is difficult for the U.N. to take timely action not only because of 
limits on intervention in internal issues of a sovereign state but also because the U.N. must 
act with the consent of member states. It is not easy to achieve consent when sovereignty is 
the issue. In light of the growing worldwide environmental refugee problem (along with 
political refugees), which often triggers or intensifies communal conflicts and threaten 
regional stability, however, these pressures are no longer manifested primarily within the 
domestic jurisdiction of a state. The tragedy of tripolarity now requires new visions and 
strategies beyond human-drawn borders.  
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